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ABSTRACT 
This Comment will argue that Washington state courts must 
promulgate a new, workable definition of “unfair-but-not-deceptive” 
under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act. Washington courts have 
acknowledged that a business act or practice can be unfair but not 
deceptive, but a simple recognition does not fulfill the liberal intentions of 
the Consumer Protection Act. By continuously declining to define unfair-
but-not-deceptive, Washington courts have left consumers vulnerable and 
without recourse. This Comment will highlight the approaches developed 
by the federal government and other state governments on how to confront 
the ambiguity of unfair-but-not-deceptive and will propose a concrete 
definition for the term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On Saturday, August 27, 2011, Neil Rush parked his car on a private 
property easement, with permission, but his car was towed by Top Notch 
Towing Company. In response, Neil filed an impound hearing request 
form, and notice was served onto Top Notch and its owner, William 
Blackburn. At the impound hearing in November, the district court found 
that Neil’s car had been illegally towed and that Neil was entitled to 
damages and to redeem his vehicle from Top Notch without the payment 
of any costs. However, William Blackburn had sold Neil’s car to himself 
at an auction for $1 in October and did not contact Neil, even though he 
had Neil’s contact information. Neil then sued Top Notch and William 
Blackburn for violation of his state’s local consumer protection law, 
alleging that the sale of his car while the impound hearing was pending 
was an unfair act. The judge granted summary judgment in favor of Top 
Notch. The court held that Top Notch and William Blackburn’s actions 
were not unfair under the law because (1) it was not a situation that was 
likely to be repeated and (2) William Blackburn’s action of selling Neil’s 
car to himself was not illegal. Consequently, Neil could not recover his 
car, although another court said he was entitled to because it was not clear 
how an act or practice is unfair in his state.1 
Consumer protection enforcement on the state level has seen a rise 
as of late, particularly in Washington. Since taking office in 2013, 
Washington State Attorney General, Bob Ferguson, has focused the 
Attorney General’s efforts on the Consumer Protection Division, doubling 
the size of the division2 and returning more than $17 million to the state 
and Washington consumers during the 2016 fiscal year alone.3 But despite 
this increase in state enforcement, and Washington law’s broad prohibition 
 
 1. Facts based on Rush v. Blackburn, 361 P.3d 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015). 
 2. About Bob Ferguson, BOB FERGUSON: ATT’Y GEN., https://www.electbobferguson.com/ 
about/ [https://perma.cc/PR2K-77DU]. 
 3. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2017), https://agportal-
s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/2016%20AR%20Print.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU6U-
UBSB]. 
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of “unfair and deceptive acts, and violations of many other consumer 
protection laws . . . ,”4 Washington courts have avoided deciding how an 
act or practice can be unfair but not deceptive. Many other states and the 
federal government have addressed this ambiguity through court 
decisions. It is imperative, now more than ever, that Washington courts 
conduct statutory interpretation to address this hole in Washington’s 
consumer protection law. 
Part I of this Comment will address the federal consumer protection 
regime and the need for local consumer protection laws. Part II will discuss 
the current Washington Consumer Protection Act and the pitfalls of 
leaving unfair-but-not-deceptive undefined. Part III will explore how 
sister jurisdictions have confronted the unfair-but-not-deceptive 
ambiguity. Part IV will argue that the Washington courts should 
affirmatively act in promulgating a definition. 
I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND A NEED FOR LOCAL 
CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 
Federal consumer protection law is not uniform, and its coverage is 
not comprehensive. For example, in response to increased telemarketing, 
robocalls, and consumer harassment, Congress passed the Telemarketing 
Consumer Protection Act of 19915 and the Telemarketing Consumer Fraud 
and Abuse Prevention Act6 in 1994, with the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC or the Commission) promulgating its own telemarketing rules, called 
the “Telemarketing Sales Rule,” in 1995.7 Robocalls still evaded federal 
regulation, and, consequently, Congress created the Do Not Call Registry 
in 2003.8 But Federal Communications Commission (FCC) data as of 
February 2019 shows that there were over 232,000 consumer complaints 
just on robocalls to the FCC in 2018 alone.9 Despite Congress’s best 
 
 4. CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 
50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS 64 (2018), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P46W-TT2X] (analyzing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the laws in each state and the District of Columbia that prohibit 
deceptive and unfair practices in consumer transactions). See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1961). 
 5. 47 U.S.C. § 227. 
 6. Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6108 (2006). 
 7. 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.1–310.9 (2010). 
 8. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6151–6155 (2003). See generally Maria G. 
Hibbard, Hanging Up Too Early: Remedies to Reduce Robocalls, 5 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & 
INTERNET 79, 85–96 (2014) (describing the statutory and regulatory structure that addresses 
robocalling and the detrimental effect of inconsistent regulation). 
 9. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, REPORT ON ROBOCALLS CG DOCKET NO. 17-59, at 4 (2019) 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-356196A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UZB-NRD6]. 
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efforts in the early 2000s,10 no uniform federal framework exists for 
consumer protection and its enforcement. Each federal law deals with a 
discrete area, usually in a unique way. The Consumer Credit Protection 
Act (CCPA), for instance, requires that credit terms be disclosed to 
borrowers and that lenders not discriminate when granting credit.11 The 
CCPA also governs consumer leases,12 debt collection,13 and electronic 
fund transfers,14 among other consumer issues. Whether consumers are 
protected depends largely on the type of institution with whom the 
consumer is doing business. Commentators have noted, for example, 
The federal law regulating debt collectors applies only to third party 
collectors. While a national bank is subject to many federal 
regulations, check cashing operations and the Internet lender PayPal 
are subject to state money transmitter laws that provide far less 
consumer protection. A national bank is subject to regulations issued 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), while a state 
chartered bank is subject to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) regulations.15 
A chaotic uncertainty exists in consumer protection laws at the 
federal level, as evidenced by the area of consumer lending. Each federal 
statute regulates a specific industry, resulting in ambiguity as to when a 
consumer’s rights have been violated. 
The FTC is the sole enforcement body for federal consumer 
protection. The FTC has the greatest discretion to provide guidance on the 
FTC Act provisions that prohibit unfair and deceptive acts or practices but 
has not vigorously enforced these federal statutes. For example, in the 
1970s, the FTC sought to resolve consumer problems by issuing 
regulations that applied to an entire sector, covering a wide breadth of 
practices.16 However, during the Reagan administration, the FTC began to 
review unfair and deceptive practices solely on a case-by-case basis;17 the 
change resulted in the FTC review only affecting the target company, 
rather than an entire industry. While it may appear that other companies 
within the same industry as the target company would be on notice that 
 
 10. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection 
Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 666–
68 (2008). 
 11. Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)–(c) (2010). 
 12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667(f) (2010). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692(o) (2010). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693(r) (2010). 
 15. Budnitz, supra note 10, at 670 (footnotes omitted). 
 16. Id. at 670–71. Examples of these 1970s-era rules include the following: The Door-to-Door 
Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2020); Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2020); Holder-In-
Due-Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2020). 
 17. Budnitz, supra note 10, at 671. 
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similar actions may be subject to FTC enforcement action, Mark Budnitz 
has argued that the FTC often does not act against other companies in the 
same sector for a number of reasons:18 
[The FTC] may not be aware of other companies that are engaging in 
that conduct. Even if it is aware, it may not have the resources to 
act. . . . Other abusive practices may take priority, requiring the FTC 
to direct its efforts elsewhere. Finally, a company may structure its 
act or practice in a way that is somewhat different from that of the 
business against which the FTC acted, giving the company the 
argument that its conduct should be distinguished from that which the 
FTC found illegal. The FTC may choose to act instead against 
companies where such distinctions cannot be made because they are 
easier to win.19 
The FTC’s sporadic enforcement of federal laws to single actors 
minimizes consumer rights, rather than expanding protections. 
Moreover, the actual consumers who are harmed by unfair and 
deceptive practices have no private right of action under the FTC Act.20 
Injured consumers may submit a consumer complaint to the FTC, but the 
FTC itself cannot resolve individual complaints.21 Returning to Neil, our 
injured consumer whose car was towed by Top Notch; Under a federal 
regime, Neil could not sue Top Notch for a violation of consumer 
protection law because the FTC has exclusive enforcement. Neil could 
only file a complaint to the FTC about the unfair practice, but any 
proceeding brought by the FTC would not settle Neil’s individual issues 
with Top Notch. Thus, in terms of federal consumer protection, consumers 
are underrepresented and powerless. They may file complaints with the 
FTC but cannot bring an action under federal law. As such, injured 
consumers must turn to their states’ consumer protection laws to resolve 
their injuries. A separate state consumer protection regime allows for 
consumers to be proactive in protecting their rights, rather than waiting for 
the FTC to potentially act against one offender. 
Consumers can fully exercise their political powers by passing local 
statutes that address their specific grievances. The doctrine of federalism 
is necessary to give the consumer political power to redress the limitations 
of the chaotic federal consumer protection laws. Washington has thusly 
responded to the federal chaos. 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 671 n.39 (citation omitted). 
 20. Id. at 675. 
 21. FTC Complaint Assistant, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/# 
crnt&panel1-1 [https://perma.cc/AJG8-KXMW]. 
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II. THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
In 1961, the Washington State Legislature passed RCW 19.86.020, 
commonly known as the Consumer Protection Act (CPA or the Act).22 The 
Act declares: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are 
hereby . . . unlawful.”23 The CPA states that the Legislature’s intent and 
purpose was “to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition,” 
mandating that the CPA “be liberally construed [so] that its beneficial 
purposes may be served.”24 The Washington Supreme Court has liberally 
construed the CPA in the past to fulfill the Act’s legislative purpose, 
holding that there can be per se violations of the CPA.25 A per se violation 
allows for plaintiffs to show unfair methods of competition or unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices through alleging the violation of another 
statute.26 There are two types of statutory declarations that might constitute 
a per se violation of the CPA: (1) when a statute has been declared by the 
Legislature to constitute an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce 
or an unfair trade practice and (2) when a statute has a separate public 
interest declaration.27 Statutes with both an “unfair or deceptive act in trade 
or commerce” declaration and a “public interest” declaration include 
statutes on personal wireless numbers,28 adoption advertising,29 credit 
reporting,30 consumer leases of motor vehicles,31 discrimination and civil 
rights,32 advertising prizes and promotions,33 and commercial telephone 
solicitation.34 Statutes with only an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” 
declaration include laws on bail bond agents,35 business opportunity 
fraud,36 pyramid schemes,37 collection agencies,38 credit service 
 
 22. 1961 Wash. Sess. Laws 1956–64; see also Jonathan A. Mark, Dispensing with the Public 
Interest Requirement in Private Causes of Action Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 29 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 205, 207–14 (2005) (providing a more detailed history of the early years of 
the CPA). 
 23. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (1961). 
 24. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1985). 
 25. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 535–36 (Wash. 
1986). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.250.040 (2008). 
 29. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.400(3) (2006). 
 30. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.150 (1993). 
 31. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.10.050 (1995). 
 32. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030(3) (2009). 
 33. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.170.010 (1991). 
 34. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.158.010 (1989), 19.158.030 (1989). 
 35. WASH. REV. CODE § 18.185.210 (1993). 
 36. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.110.170 (1981). 
 37. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.275.040 (2006). 
 38. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.16.440 (1994). 
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agencies,39 and franchises.40 The Washington Courts have played an active 
role in realizing the purpose of the CPA and expanding consumer rights in 
Washington, and should continue. 
Under the original iteration of the CPA, the State Attorney General 
possessed sole enforcement power. The State Legislature amended the 
CPA in 1970 to allow for a private right of action, in response to the need 
for additional enforcement capabilities.41 The burdens on the State as a 
plaintiff versus a private citizen are notable. To succeed on a CPA claim, 
the State must prove (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) 
occurring in trade or commerce; and (3) that has a public interest impact.42 
Conversely, a private plaintiff must show five distinct elements: (1) an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) 
which has a public interest impact; (4) an injury to the plaintiff’s business 
or property; and (5) causation.43 Common to both types of plaintiffs is the 
essential requirement for a CPA claim: an unfair or deceptive act. Because 
the CPA does not define unfair or deceptive, the onus is on the courts to 
define these critical words “through a gradual process of judicial inclusion 
and exclusion.”44 The meaning of deceptive has been well litigated.45 
Deception exists if a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to 
mislead a reasonable consumer occurs.46 Washington courts have noted, 
however, that the “or” between unfair and deceptive is disjunctive and that 
“an act or practice can be unfair without being deceptive.”47 
But what does it mean for an act to be unfair without being 
deceptive? When pressed on this issue, Washington courts have largely 
deferred to federal interpretation and have not created any meaningful 
jurisprudence that allows for either the State or an individual plaintiff to 
concretely know what is required to succeed on an unfair-but-not-
deceptive CPA claim. The Washington Court of Appeals has provided 
some guidance on what constitutes unfairness under the CPA. For 
 
 39. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.134.070(5) (1986). 
 40. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.100.190 (2011). 
 41. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2009). See generally Susan Clyatt Lybeck, Recent 
Developments, New Consumer Protection Private Action Test: Clarification or Further Confusion?—
Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986), 
62 WASH. L. REV. 277 (1987) (for a contemporaneous response to the 1970 amendment allowing for 
a CPA private right of action). 
 42. State v. Kaiser, 254 P.3d 850, 858 (Wash Ct. App. 2011). 
 43. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 
(Wash. 1986). 
 44. Saunders v. Lloyd’s of London, 779 P.2d 249, 256–57 (Wash. 1989). 
 45. See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 885 (Wash. 2008); Hangman Ridge 
Training Stables, Inc., 719 P.2d at 535; Behnke v. Ahrens, 294 P.3d 729, 734–76 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2012). 
 46. State v. Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc., 398 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). 
 47. Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 1187 (Wash. 2013). 
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example, the court held in Magney v. Lincoln Mutual Savings Bank that 
an act can be unfair under the CPA if it offends public policy in a general 
sense, is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or causes 
substantial injury to consumers, competition, or other businesses, relying 
on a United States Supreme Court ruling.48 But, another case in the 
Washington Court of Appeals held that unfair is an act or practice that is 
“not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest.”49 And the 
Washington Supreme Court noted in dicta that an act can be unfair without 
being deceptive, relying on a different federal law, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n), 
which states a practice is unfair if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits.”50 While in 
Klem the Washington Supreme Court noted that the federal law could have 
an impact on the meaning of the CPA, the Court also said that what that 
means “must wait for another day.”51 
That day has come. The uncertainty in what makes an act unfair and 
deference to federal interpretations can no longer stand. If the CPA is to 
fulfill its purpose to protect the public and foster fair and honest 
competition, amidst the growing rise of blue state federalism, Washington 
courts should create its own jurisprudence and not rely on a federal 
interpretation of unfair but not deceptive. 
The case of State v. Arlene’s Flowers illustrates the dilemma. 
Washington sued Arlene’s Flowers, a florist located in Richland, who 
refused to provide services for a same-sex wedding in 2013.52 The owner 
of Arlene’s Flowers rejected the Attorney General’s request to comply 
with Washington law prohibiting businesses from discriminating on the 
basis of sexual orientation.53 Subsequently, the State filed suit claiming a 
per se CPA violation under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination 
(WLAD) and a CPA violation for an unfair practice in trade or 
commerce.54 The trial court found that Arlene’s Flowers violated the CPA 
as an unfair or deceptive act, even if the florist had not committed a per se 
violation of the Act.55 In a unanimous decision, the Washington Supreme 
 
 48. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav. 
Bank, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).  
 49. Folweiler Chiropractic, PS v. Am. Fam. Ins. Co., 429 P.3d 813, 818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) 
(quoting Klem, 295 P.3d at 1187) (internal quotations omitted). 
 50. Klem, 295 P.3d at 1187. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief Under the Consumer Protection Act, State v. 
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (No. 13-2-00871-5), 2013 WL 10257916 
[hereinafter Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint]. 
 53. AG ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3. 
 54. Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint, supra note 52. 
 55. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 567 n.23 (Wash. 2017). 
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Court upheld the trial court’s decision, holding that Arlene’s Flowers 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation56 and that the owner’s sale 
of floral arrangements was not expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.57 
While the trial court’s finding of the unfair CPA violation was not an 
issue on appeal,58 the United States Supreme Court vacated the 
Washington Supreme Court ruling and remanded for further consideration 
in light of its decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission.59 Masterpiece Cakeshop is a strikingly similar case in which 
a Colorado baker refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.60 
The United States Supreme Court declared that the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, acting pursuant to the Colorado Anti–Discrimination Act, 
violated the Free Exercise Clause and that religious and philosophical 
objections to gay marriage are protected views and may be forms of 
expression.61 
Arlene’s Flowers’ act of denying flowers to a same-sex couple was 
an unfair-but-not-deceptive act. The Washington Supreme Court on 
remand, and in reviewing Arlene’s Flowers in light of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, did not hold that Arlene’s Flowers’ objections to gay marriage 
are protected views.62 But again, Arlene’s Flowers has filed a writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court to review the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision from the perspective of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop.63 While Justice Anthony Kennedy—the author of the majority 
opinion in Masterpiece—has retired, it is entirely possible for the 
increasingly conservative Supreme Court to side with Arlene’s Flowers.64 
 
 56. Id. at 552. 
 57. Id. at 556–60. The owner of Arlene’s Flowers argued that her floral arrangements are artistic 
expressions protected by both the state and federal constitutions and that the state discrimination law 
impermissibly compelled her to speak in favor of same-sex marriage. Id. at 556. The Court found that 
the owner did not carry her burden to prove her floral arrangements constituted speech. Id. 
 58. Id. at 567 n.23. 
 59. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.). 
 60. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
 61. Id. at 1731–32. 
 62. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203 (Wash. 2019) (finding that WLAD was 
neutrally applied to the owner of Arlene’s Flowers and that the application of WLAD neither violated 
her First Amendment protections against compelled speech nor violated her right to religious free 
exercise). 
 63. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) 
(mem.) (No. 17-108), 2017 WL 3126218. 
 64. Following the retirement of Justice Kennedy, President Trump appointed another 
conservative justice to the Court—Brett Kavanaugh. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn in 
After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018 
/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/3B7F-SATM]. Justice 
Kavanaugh is a well-respected member of the Federalist Society, an influential conservative legal 
group, and has spoken at Federalist Society events, even after his confirmation to the Supreme Court. 
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If that is the case, the state’s attorney general would not succeed on its per 
se CPA violation claim through WLAD; but it is unclear whether this 
would impact the consumers, a same-sex couple who have been together 
since 2004 and who simply wanted to purchase flowers for their 
wedding,65 and their private right of action. 
What is clear is that, in Arlene’s Flowers, both the State and the 
private consumers66 alleged a CPA violation of an unfair-but-not-
deceptive practice.67 And no reliable jurisprudence exists for the State or 
consumers to utilize. If Washington is to fulfill the promise and purpose 
of the CPA, the court must define when an act is unfair-but-not-deceptive. 
III. SISTER JURISDICTIONS CONFRONT THE AMBIGUITY 
A. Federal: Unfair Consumer Injury 
Relying on FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., the Washington 
Court of Appeals held in Magney that an act can be unfair under the CPA 
if it (1) offends public policy in a general sense, (2) is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous, or (3) causes substantial injury to consumers, 
competition, or other businesses.68 In FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 
the United States Supreme Court adopted the three factor test that the FTC 
considers in determining whether a practice is unfair.69 The Sperry three 
factor test is specific to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTC Act) that prohibits, in part, “unfair . . . acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”70 The federal statute also notes, however, that public 
policy “may not serve as a primary basis” for a determination of 
 
See Adam Liptak, Kavanaugh Recalls His Confirmation at Conservative Legal Group’s Annual Gala, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/us/kavanaugh-federalist-
society.html [https://perma.cc/6WFJ-7RYS]. Justice Kavanaugh’s addition to the Supreme Court has 
only contributed to the growing conservative trend of the Roberts Court. See Amelia Thomson-
DeVeaux, Is the Supreme Court Heading for a Conservative Revolution?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 7, 
2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-heading-for-a-conservative-
revolution [https://perma.cc/Z9PK-6ZXN]. It is therefore very likely, in the author’s opinion, that the 
current makeup of the Supreme Court would side with the florist in this case and extend Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s ruling. 
 65. ACLU, Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers–Complaint, https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/ 
ingersoll-v-arlenes-flowers-complaint [https://perma.cc/QH65-G9DV] [hereinafter Arlene’s Flowers 
Ingersoll Complaint]. 
 66. The couple, Robert Ingersoll and Curtis Freed, filed a private lawsuit against Arlene’s 
Flowers, which the trial court consolidated with the State’s case. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 
P.3d 543, 550 (Wash. 2017). 
 67. Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint, supra note 52; Arlene’s Flowers Ingersoll Complaint, 
supra 65, at 5. 
 68. Magney v. Lincoln Mut. Sav. Bank, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). 
 69. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) [hereinafter Sperry test]. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
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unfairness.71 In addition, federal courts have relied on a Commission 
policy statement promulgated in 198072 that contained an abstract 
definition of “unfairness.”73 The Commission’s policy statement asserts 
that unjustified substantial consumer injury is the primary focus of the 
FTC Act and is the most important of the three Sperry factors.74 
Accordingly, Congress has since enacted 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).75 The 
statute states that an act or practice that causes consumer injury is unfair 
when the injury satisfies three elements: (1) the injury must be substantial; 
(2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to 
consumers or competition that the practice produces; and (3) it must be an 
injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided.76 In 
addition to these elements, it also appears that federal courts are 
interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) to include an element of causation.77 
1. Substantial Injury 
First, a federal court has held that the FTC can satisfy substantiality 
by establishing consumers “were injured by a practice for which they did 
not bargain.”78 An act or practice can also create a substantial injury by 
doing a small harm to a large class of people or if it raises a significant risk 
of concrete harm.79 These type of injuries generally refer to consumer 
injuries that were monetary in nature and affected a wide range of 
individuals. But federal and FTC administrative court decisions have also 
found substantial consumer injury where the injury was physical, concrete 
harm or risk of such harm.80 
 
 71. Id. at § 45(n). 
 72. Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, FTC to Hon. Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Senate 
Consumer Subcomm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., and Hon. John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority 
Leader, Senate Consumer Subcomm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in Int’l 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 app. at 1070–76, 1071 (1984) [hereinafter F.T.C. Unfairness Policy 
Statement], https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness [https:// 
perma.cc/E6B3-PT46]. 
 73. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 1998); see also FTC v. 
Windward Mktg., Inc., No. Civ.A 1:96–CV–615F, 1997 WL 33642380, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 
1997). 
 74. F.T.C. Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 72.  
 75. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See infra Part III.a.iv. 
 78. FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 79. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 80. See Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984) (explaining that consumers were injured by a 
defect in defendant’s tractors, which caused hot fuel to shoot or geyser up to twenty feet); Philip 
Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973) (stating consumers were at a risk of harm because razor blades were 
distributed for a promotion without any warning labels). Cf. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) 
(showing that prior to the Section 5 amendments discussed above, the Supreme Court rejected the 
FTC’s assertion that a diet pill manufacturer violated Section 5 because the agency failed to 
1022 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 43:1011 
In International Harvester, the FTC found through the defendant 
company’s documents that out of roughly 1.3 million tractors sold, 
“twelve are known to have been involved in geysering accidents involving 
bodily injury. This is an accident rate of less than .001 percent, over a 
period of more than 40 years.”81 The FTC therefore knew the specific 
individuals who had been physically injured by the unfair practice and had 
even taken their depositions.82 Thus, it appears that when the unfair 
practice causes a physical consumer injury, it helps prove the injury when 
the FTC has identified actual injured consumers. In contrast, the FTC 
administrative court in Philip Morris held that the risk of physical injury 
to small children, because of a corporation’s actions in distributing razor 
blades for a promotion, amounted to an unfair act or practice.83 The mere 
risk of injury because of an unsafe marketing technique was sufficient for 
the administrative court to hold that Philip Morris had engaged in an unfair 
act. Philip Morris, and even International Harvester, represent exceptions 
to the norm, as most of the FTC’s actions under 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) involve 
a substantial, monetary injury. 
2. Balancing 
Second, the federal statute also prohibits finding a practice to be 
unfair if the allegedly unfair act is outweighed by countervailing benefits 
to consumers or to competition.84 In probing the limits of balancing, FTC 
v. Windward Marketing Inc. held that when a practice produces clear 
adverse consequences for consumers that are not accompanied by an 
increase in services or benefits to consumers or benefits to competition, 
then the unfairness of the practice is not outweighed.85 
3. Consumer Avoidance 
Finally, consumers must act to avoid injury before it occurs if they 
“have reason to anticipate the impending harm and the means to avoid it, 
or if consumers were aware of, and are reasonably capable of pursuing, 
potential avenues toward mitigating the injury after the fact.”86 When 
determining if consumers reasonably could have avoided any injury, the 
 
demonstrate harm to competition; however, the Court found that the FTC did present evidence that 
the practices could be harmful to the consumers). 
 81. Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. at 1063. 
 82. Id. at 1017. 
 83. Philip Morris, Inc., 82 F.T.C. 16 (1973). 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
 85. FTC v. Windward Mktg., Inc., No. Civ.A 1:96–CV–615F, 1997 WL 33642380, at *11 (N.D. 
Ga. Sept. 30, 1997). 
 86. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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federal circuit focuses on “whether the consumers had a free and informed 
choice that would have enabled them to avoid the unfair practice.”87 
4. Causation? 
Federal courts have also recently held that a causation element must 
be shown by the FTC in proving an unfair consumer injury claim. In FTC 
v. Neovi, Inc., the Ninth Circuit analyzed, on an appeal from a summary 
judgment grant for the FTC, specifically whether the FTC had met the 
causation requirement.88 The complaint merely pled that the defendants’ 
“actions have resulted in financial losses to victims,” and then proceeded 
to list out the consumer’s injuries.89 In the District of New Jersey, ruling 
on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the “FTC’s 
allegations also permit the Court to reasonably infer that [the Defendant’s] 
data-security practices caused theft of personal data, which ultimately 
caused substantial injury to consumers.”90 It, therefore, appears that the 
federal courts allow for basic level causation to satisfy the consumer injury 
unfairness test, but causation must nonetheless be alleged. 
When all three, potentially four, elements are met for an unfairness 
claim, the unfairness cases brought by the FTC generally fall into one of 
four categories: (1) use of coercion or high pressure selling; (2) 
withholding material information; (3) making claims without 
substantiation; or (4) post-purchase rights and remedies.91 The 
Commission may exercise its unfairness jurisdiction over practices that do 
not fit into one of the listed categories, but the FTC is still limited to only 
pursuing unfair acts or practices that cause consumer injury.92 
B. Illinois: Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act 
Illinois’s version of the CPA is the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) and is intended to protect 
consumers, borrowers, and business persons against fraud, unfair methods 
of competition, and other unfair and deceptive business practices.93 Like 
the Washington CPA, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act is to be liberally 
 
 87. Windward Mktg., 1997 WL 33642380, at *11. See also FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 
1158 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 88. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d at 1155.  
 89. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 4, FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 
(9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06-CV-1952-R-JMA). 
 90. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 624 (D. N.J. 2014). 
 91. PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.04 
(2018). 
 92. Id. 
 93. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (1992). 
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construed to effectuate its purpose.94 The Consumer Fraud Act differs 
from the CPA, however, in the elements required to bring a successful 
claim. Illinois requires (1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) 
that the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely on the deception; and 
(3) that the deception occurred during a course of conduct involving trade 
or commerce.95 
Illinois courts have similarly held that a business practice can be 
unfair-but-not-deceptive and have stated that whether a practice is unfair 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.96 The Consumer Fraud Act 
actually mandates that “consideration shall be given to the interpretations 
of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section 
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act”97 when an Illinois court 
determines whether an act is unfair under the Consumer Fraud Act. Similar 
to the Washington Courts, the Illinois Courts have acknowledged the 
FTC’s three factor test promulgated in Sperry and Hutchinson; however, 
the Illinois Courts––unlike the Washington Courts––have actually applied 
the test in order to construe the Consumer Fraud Act to effectuate its 
purpose liberally. 
For example, in Saunders v. Michigan Avenue National Bank, the 
plaintiff brought suit under the Consumer Fraud Act alleging that the Bank 
engaged in an unfair practice, and, on appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals 
reviewed her claim using the Sperry test.98 The court, in this case, failed 
to find that the Bank’s overdraft fee practice violated the Sperry test; the 
court held that for the defendant’s conduct to be unfair, the conduct must 
violate public policy, be so oppressive as to leave the consumer with little 
alternative except to submit to it, and injure the consumer.99 This holding 
suggests that all three factors of the Sperry test must be met to establish an 
unfair-but-not-deceptive claim in Illinois. In Jones v. Universal Casualty 
Co., the Illinois court rejected an unfair-but-not-deceptive claim 
subsequent to initially adopting the Sperry test that failed to plead all three 
factors.100 
In response, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly held that a plaintiff 
does not bear the burden of establishing all three factors.101 The Illinois 
Supreme Court turned to the Connecticut Supreme Court to support its 
 
 94. Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 191 (Ill. 1998). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Scott v. Ass’n for Childbirth at Home, Int’l, 430 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (Ill. 1981); Elder v. 
Coronet Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d 1312, 1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).  
 97. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (1992). 
 98. Saunders v. Mich. Ave. Nat’l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 602, 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 99. Id. (citing FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 250 n.5 (1972)). 
 100. See Jones v. Universal Cas. Co., 630 N.E.2d 94, 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 101. Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 961 (Ill. 2002). 
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ruling, evidencing that other state courts turn to sister jurisdictions in 
confronting the unfair-but-not-deceptive ambiguity.102 The Illinois 
Supreme Court adopted the Connecticut ruling from Cheshire as its own: 
“All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of 
unfairness. A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it 
meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.”103 
1. Immoral, Unethical, Oppressive, or Unscrupulous 
Under the Consumer Fraud Act, a practice is considered immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous “if it imposes a lack of meaningful 
choice or an unreasonable burden on the consumer.”104 In one such case, 
a plaintiff brought suit under the Consumer Fraud Act alleging an unfair 
practice when his car was wrongfully repossessed.105 In Demitro v. 
General Motors Acceptance Corp., an employee of General Motors 
discovered that the plaintiff’s car had been wrongfully repossessed; rather 
than returning the vehicle to the plaintiff and allowing the plaintiff to bring 
his account current by paying a little over $2,000, the employee decided 
to keep the vehicle until the plaintiff could pay off the outstanding balance 
of $39,695.04.106 While the court found this act caused substantial injury 
to the plaintiff by damaging his credit rating, it ultimately held that the 
defendant engaged in an unfair business practice because its act was 
oppressive.107 The defendant left the plaintiff with only two options: pay 
the entire outstanding balance of nearly $40,000 or lose his vehicle.108 
When Illinois courts find oppressive conduct in an unfair-but-not-
deceptive claim, it appears they also find substantial consumer injury.109 
Illinois courts often, if not exclusively, require a financial injury when 
finding that an act was oppressive. 
 
 102. Id. (citing Cheshire Mortg. Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 A.2d 1130, 1143 (Conn. 1992)). 
 103. Cheshire, 612 A.2d at 1143–44. 
 104. Stonecrafters, Inc. v. Foxfire Printing and Packaging, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d. 610, 614 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009) (quoting W. Ry. Devices Corp. v. Lusida Rubber Prods., Inc., No. 06 C 0052, 2006 WL 
1697119, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2006)); see also Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 962; W. Ry. Devices Corp., 
2006 WL 1697119, at *6. 
 105. Demitro v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 902 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1168–69. 
 109. See id.; Dubey v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265, 278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that 
the defendant’s conduct was oppressive where the plaintiff was never served with a notice of lien or 
notice as to the auction sale of her property and that, as a result, the plaintiff suffered substantial injury 
by the permanent loss of property). 
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2. Public Policy 
Claiming unfair-but-not-deceptive under the public policy Sperry 
factor can present a more challenging claim for plaintiffs. In Illinois, a 
practice can offend public policy if it violates an existing statute or 
common law doctrine that typically applies to such a situation.110 In 
allowing a public policy violation to prove an unfair-but-not-deceptive 
claim through a violation of an existing statute, Illinois has effectively 
allowed plaintiffs to predicate their Consumer Fraud Act claims on other 
statutes or regulations that do not allow for private enforcement.111 This 
definition of a public policy violation allows individual consumers to 
challenge unfair business practices when the government has failed to 
regulate or bring its own action against the perpetrator. In essence, Illinois 
has acknowledged that a regulatory violation, even if the violation itself is 
not a per se violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, offends public policy 
and is an unfair-but-not-deceptive practice. But this means that a plaintiff 
must also prove the elements of the additional statutory or regulatory 
violation in addition to the elements required to prove a Consumer Fraud 
Act claim. 
If a plaintiff fails to identify a violation of a particular statute that 
contains a standard of conduct, he or she can still allege a violation of a 
common law doctrine that typically applies in the situation. For instance, 
in Boyd v. U.S. Bank, a plaintiff alleged an unfair-but-not-deceptive 
Consumer Fraud Act violation under two statutory violations and a 
violation of the defendants’ common law duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.112 While the defendants moved to dismiss the unfair practice 
claim under the public policy statute prong, the defendants did not seek to 
dismiss the unfair-but-not-deceptive claim under the theory of common 
law violation.113 Illinois courts have thus strengthened consumer 
protection by incorporating common law violations as wrongs. 
Both the statutory and common law definitions of public policy for 
an unfair-but-not-deceptive claim expand the Consumer Fraud Act to 
 
 110. See Ekl v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d 156, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the defendant’s 
conduct was offensive to public policy because it implicates the common law doctrine that contracts 
which are the product of duress will be voided); Elder v. Coronet Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d 1312, 1314, 
1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding that an insurer requiring a claimant take a polygraph test to “speed 
up investigation and settlement of [his] claim” violated public policy because of an Illinois statutory 
prohibition against requiring a party to submit to a polygraph test in a civil trial or a pre-trial 
proceeding). 
 111. See Gainer Bank, N.A. v. Jenkins, 672 N.E.2d 317, 318–19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding 
that a plaintiff may predicate a Consumer Fraud Act claim on the Illinois Motor Vehicle Retail 
Installment Sales Act, though this act does not create a private right of action). 
 112. Boyd v. U.S. Bank, N.A., ex rel. Sasco Aames Mortg. Loan Tr., Series 2003-1, 787 F. Supp. 
2d 747, 752 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 113. Id. 
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reach most aspects of a business’s duties—duties it holds not just to 
consumers—within Illinois. While the public policy Sperry factor seems 
to be a catch-all for the Consumer Fraud Act, what happens when an 
unfair-but-not-deceptive public policy claim cannot meet the requirements 
of a statutory or common law violation? A federal court in the Northern 
District of Illinois, when reviewing a Consumer Fraud Act claim, 
suggested that when such a situation occurs, “the determination of public 
policy is primarily a legislative function.”114 
In sum, a consumer in Illinois can bring an unfair-but-not-deceptive 
claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. The Illinois courts have liberally 
construed the Consumer Fraud Act to include unfair-but-not-deceptive 
claims and have also adopted the Sperry factor test. When applying the 
Sperry test in Illinois, a consumer does not need to prove all three factors, 
thus increasing the likelihood the consumer will succeed on his or her 
claim, and the liberal purpose of the Consumer Fraud Act will be fulfilled. 
IV. WASHINGTON’S SOLUTION 
If the CPA is to fulfill the intentions of Washington’s legislature,115 
Washington courts must define unfair-but-not-deceptive. By simply 
holding that an act or practice can be unfair-but-not-deceptive but not 
providing a definition, the Washington courts ignore the CPA’s purpose 
and leave consumers vulnerable when they should be protected. I call upon 
the courts to define unfair-but-not-deceptive and fill this hole to protect 
Washington’s consumers. 
Legislators foresaw that gaps in the CPA would exist and dictated 
that “the courts be guided by final decisions of the federal courts and final 
orders of the federal trade commission interpreting the various federal 
statutes dealing with the same or similar matters” when making 
unprecedented decisions.116 Washington courts have acknowledged the 
Sperry test,117 as well as the consumer injury statute,118 in connection to 
the CPA mandate. But when we look to the application of federal law, the 
federal definition of unfair-but-not-deceptive falls short of the protections 
needed in Washington. While the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged the three factors that make an act or practice unfair in 
 
 114. City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 211 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(quoting Coleman v. E. Joliet Fire Prot. Dist., 46 N.E.3d 741, 757 (Ill. 2016)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 115. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2020). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972); Magney v. Lincoln Mut. 
Sav. Bank, 659 P.2d 537, 545 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). 
 118. See Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 295 P.3d 1179, 1187 (Wash. 2013). 
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Sperry,119 the FTC has almost exclusively pursued unfair-but-not-
deceptive acts or practices involving unjustified substantial consumer 
injury, pursuant to the FTC’s 1980 policy statement.120 If Washington 
courts were to look to the FTC solely for guidance to define unfair-but-
not-deceptive, the federal definition would fall short in protecting 
Washington consumers. 
First, not all unfair practices involve consumer injury. Consumer 
injuries, as pursued by the FTC, are usually monetary or concrete physical 
harm.121 The unfair-but-not-deceptive claim brought against Arlene’s 
Flowers by the Washington State Attorney General did not involve such a 
consumer injury; sexual orientation discrimination, on its face, is neither 
an injury that is monetary nor physical.122 While the per se CPA violation 
against Arlene’s Flowers did not fail on remand in light of the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop’s ruling, the growing conservative trend of the United States 
Supreme Court could remove WLAD per se CPA violations.123 Defining 
unfair-but-not-deceptive only as a substantial consumer injury still inhibits 
the Washington Attorney General from pursuing similar claims to protect 
vulnerable consumers. 
Second, defining unfair-but-not-deceptive as exclusively a 
substantial consumer injury imports an element of causation to the CPA.124 
While private plaintiffs must allege causation to succeed on a CPA 
claim,125 the State does not.126 If Washington courts only use the federal 
approach, they will have to import the causation element. It is at the State’s 
advantage to only have to prove three elements for the CPA, and including 
causation through defining unfair-but-not-deceptive as exclusively an act 
or practice that causes substantial consumer injury would restrict the State 
rather than expand consumer rights and protections. Importing the federal 
definition of unfair-but-not-deceptive is not fatal to the CPA, but 
exclusively defining unfair-but-not-deceptive in Washington as 
exclusively an act or practice that causes substantial consumer injury does 
not fulfill the intentions of the CPA. 
Washington courts should follow federal guidance for the substantial 
consumer injury factor of the Sperry test, but the courts should also allow 
 
 119. Sperry, 405 U.S. at 244. 
 120. F.T.C Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 72. 
 121. See discussion supra Section III.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
 122. See Arlene’s Flowers State Complaint, supra note 52; Arlene’s Flowers Ingersoll 
Complaint, supra 65. 
123. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 124. See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1155–57 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 125. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 
1986). 
 126. State v. Kaiser, 254 P.3d 850, 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
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the other two Sperry factors to serve as a basis for an unfair-but-not-
deceptive CPA claim. Washington courts have recognized the Sperry 
test,127 but have not held that the test can be disjunctive as other states, like 
Illinois and Connecticut, have done.128 Illinois’s early unfair-but-not-
deceptive jurisprudence serves as an example of how the Sperry test can 
limit consumer protections when courts require that a plaintiff meet all 
three factors of the test. Recognizing that the Sperry test follows federal 
consumer protection guidelines and applying it in the disjunctive allows 
state courts to expand beyond the limitations of the FTC Act and develop 
readily needed consumer protections at the state level. Washington should 
follow in the path of other state courts, like Illinois and Connecticut, to 
recognize that an act or practice can be unfair-but-not-deceptive to the 
degree that the act or practice meets one of the Sperry test factors. 
The Washington courts should hold that oppressive conduct is 
conduct that leaves consumers no other choice but to submit to the unfair 
practice as it is defined in the Sperry opinion.129 Oppressive conduct that 
can amount to an unfair-but-not-deceptive business practice does not have 
to be monetary in nature since monetary injuries to plaintiffs can also fall 
under the substantial injury prong of the Sperry test. Washington courts 
need not follow Illinois unfair-but-not-deceptive jurisprudence exactly. 
Illinois courts have found oppressive conduct under the Sperry test to 
mean acts or practices that have monetary effects on consumers.130 
Connecticut courts, on the other hand, see oppressive conduct to mean “[a] 
trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the 
expense of the plaintiff’s rights[.]”131 Washington courts can then find that 
conduct that does not have drastic monetary effects on consumers is 
oppressive. When considering this prong of the Sperry test to find an 
unfair-but-not-deceptive act or practice, a Washington court should ask 
whether the consumer had any choice in agreeing to the 
business’s conduct. 
An act or practice that offends public policy, the final Sperry factor, 
serves as a catch-all for unfair-but-not-deceptive claims in Illinois, and it 
should in Washington. Following Illinois’s precedent for an unfair-but-
not-deceptive public policy violation provides a private right to action for 
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statutes that do not have a private right to action.132 The public policy 
definition allows individual consumers to hold businesses responsible for 
violations of statutes and regulations when the state or federal government 
fails to intervene. Some may argue that such a definition for an unfair-but-
not-deceptive act or practice would disempower the State in its own 
enforcement actions. I argue that defining public policy violations in such 
a way enhances the regulations and statutes. Businesses must follow such 
regulations and statutes or face enforcement from the State as well as from 
harmed consumers. While defining public policy in this way would require 
the State and private plaintiffs to establish the elements of the regulatory 
or statutory violation, this requirement is no different than the 
requirements of a per se CPA violation.133 Additionally, importing the 
Washington legislature’s definitions of public policy allows consumers 
and the legislature to provide additional definitions of unfair-but-not-
deceptive public policy violations. 
Washington courts must hold that any of the three Sperry factors can 
serve as the basis of an unfair-but-not-deceptive CPA claim. Doing so will 
both fulfill the legislative purpose of the CPA, which is to be liberally 
construed, and expand consumer protection rights in Washington. 
CONCLUSION 
Washington State has a comprehensive consumer protection law and 
a dedicated consumer advocate as State Attorney General. But the CPA as 
it stands today is insufficient to protect consumers from acts or practices 
that are unfair-but-not-deceptive. By continuously declining to define 
unfair-but-not-deceptive, Washington courts have left consumers 
vulnerable and without recourse. If a business practice is not deceptive by 
being either a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead 
a reasonable consumer,134 but causes consumer harm, that practice is still 
harmful. For example, the consumer harmed in Arlene’s Flowers was not 
misled, but was denied services because of his sexual orientation: a 
patently unfair act.135 If the U.S. Supreme Court grants the petition for writ 
of certiorari, and the per se violation of the CPA fails, such a consumer is 
left vulnerable to such abhorrent business practices because Washington 
courts have failed to define unfair-but-not-deceptive. 
Washington’s sister jurisdictions demonstrate that it is possible to 
confront the ambiguity of unfair-but-not-deceptive. Washington courts 
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should actively promulgate the CPA’s definition of unfair-but-not-
deceptive. Washington courts must acknowledge that consumers are 
harmed without being deceived, and individuals will be empowered and 
stand against business practices that are unfair but not deceptive. Anything 
less fails to effectuate the law’s protective purpose. 
